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Abstract
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit, in Alfadda v. Fenn, properly held that the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy involving few U.S. activities and
actors because the actors engaged in significant conduct in the United States. Part I examines
the principles and pertinent case law governing the extraterritorial application of the civil RICO
statute. Part II describes the facts and procedural his- tory of Alfadda v. Fenn, detailing the district
court’s denial of subject matter jurisdiction and the Second Circuit’s subse- quent reversal. Part III
argues that the Second Circuit cor- rectly applied the existing legal precedents by granting federal
subject matter jurisdiction over this case and examines the im- plications of the decision. It also
argues that, given the com- peting interests at stake, U.S. courts should grant jurisdiction over
predominantly non-U.S. transactions only where, as here, the evidence demonstrates substantial
conduct or a substantial effect within the United States. This Comment concludes that Congress
should amend RICO and clearly delineate its extra- territorial application so that courts need no
longer speculate about congressional intent. This Comment argues that the Second Circuit, in
Alfadda v. Fenn, properly held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy involving few U.S. activities and actors because the actors engaged in significant conduct in
the United States. Part I examines the principles and pertinent case law governing the extraterritorial application of the civil RICO statute. Part II describes the facts and procedural his- tory of
Alfadda v. Fenn, detailing the district court’s denial of subject matter jurisdiction and the Second
Circuit’s subse- quent reversal. Part III argues that the Second Circuit cor- rectly applied the existing legal precedents by granting federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case and examines
the im- plications of the decision. It also argues that, given the com- peting interests at stake, U.S.
courts should grant jurisdiction over predominantly non-U.S. transactions only where, as here, the
evidence demonstrates substantial conduct or a substantial effect within the United States. This
Comment concludes that Congress should amend RICO and clearly delineate its extra- territorial
application so that courts need no longer speculate about congressional intent.

COMMENTS
ALFADDA v. FENN: SHIFTING THE STANDARD FOR
APPLYING U.S. STATUTES TO
PREDOMINANTLY NON-U.S.
TRANSACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Congress passed the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO" or the "Act")' in the
1970s to enable the federal government and private litigants to
redress harms caused by patterns of illegal activity.2 Although
Congress primarily intended to eradicate organized crime
through RICO, the Act also has been applied to racketeering
activity in the civil context.3 Application of the statute presents
no problems when the alleged activity occurs entirely within
the United States or when all the parties are U.S. citizens. 4 A
jurisdictional difficulty arises, however, when the illegal activity
occurs substantially outside the United States or the actors are
predominantly non-U.S. citizens. 5
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991) [hereinafter RICO or the
Act]. The statute defines "racketeering activity" as
any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year.
Id. § 1961(1).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4010 (further explaining RICO). The statute defines a "pattern
of racketeering activity" as
requir[ing] at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred
after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
3. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. IMREX Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (stating
that it is unlawful for any person, not just participants in organized crime, to violate
RICO). The difference between the civil and the criminal provisions of the Act lies in
the punishment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964. Criminal penalties are set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 1963 and civil remedies are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
4. See, e.g., Haviland v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 947 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying RICO to wholly U.S.-based transaction involving only U.S. citizens), cert. denied
sub nom. J. Aron & Co. v. Haviland, 112 S. Ct. 1995 (1992).
5. See Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.) (involving RICO claims with primarily non-U.S. parties), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991); United States v. Parness,
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In Alfadda v. Fenn ,6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expanded the extraterritorial application of RICO

by granting subject matter jurisdiction over a case involving
primarily non-U.S. actors and a transaction substantially completed outside the United States.7 Alfadda is particularly important because it addresses the extraterritorial application of
the RICO statute, while most earlier cases addressed the extraterritoriality of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
("SEA")' or the Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA").9 In addition, Alfadda marks the first time a U.S. court has granted
U.S. subject matter
jurisdiction over a RICO claim using the
"conduct" test' ° and the "effects" test" employed in SEA and
CEA litigation.' 2 By expanding the SEA and CEA precedents
to RICO claims, the Second Circuit furthered the overall goal
of RICO, which is to eradicate ongoing illegal or fraudulent
503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); Philan Ins. Ltd.
v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 748 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).
6. 935 F.2d 475.
7. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991); see, e.g., Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz,
712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983) (involving SEA violation); Continental Grain (Australia)
Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); SEC v. Kasser,
548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. Ltd. v. SEC,
431 U.S. 938 (1977); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (same);
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom.
Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (same and stating that purpose of Securities and Exchange Act (hereinafter SEA] is to protect against fraud in
sale and purchase of securities regardless of whether or not traded on U.S. markets).
9. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988); see Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730
F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.) (involving CEA violation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984);
Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983) (same). Tamari states
that the purpose of the Commodities Exchange Act [hereinafter CEA] is to ensure
fair dealing on commodities exchanges, for the protection of the market and of those
who would be injured by unreasonable fluctuations in commodities prices. 730 F.2d
at 1106.
10. See, e.g., Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334 (holding that when significant conduct occurs within United States and Congress has not clearly forbidden extraterritorial application,' statute may be applied extraterritorially).
11. Id. at 1340 (stating that when acts of individual performed outside state
cause effects within state, jurisdiction should be granted for cause of action arising
from those effects).
12. See United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974) (granting U.S. jurisdiction over RICO claim without applying conduct and effects tests), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975); but see Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 748 F. Supp. 190
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying conduct and effects tests but denying jurisdiction).
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ventures, as distinct from individual illegal or fraudulent acts. ,3
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit, in Alfadda
v. Fenn, properly held that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over a controversy involving few U.S. activities and
actors because the actors engaged in significant conduct in the
United States. Part I examines the principles and pertinent
case law governing the extraterritorial application of the civil
RICO statute. Part II describes the facts and procedural history of Alfadda v. Fenn, detailing the district court's denial of
subject matter jurisdiction and the Second Circuit's subsequent reversal. Part III argues that the Second Circuit correctly applied the existing legal precedents by granting federal
subject matter jurisdiction over this case and examines the implications of the decision. It also argues that, given the competing interests at stake, U.S. courts should grant jurisdiction
over predominantly non-U.S. transactions only where, as here,
the evidence demonstrates substantial conduct or a substantial
effect within the United States. This Comment concludes that
Congress should amend RICO and clearly delineate its extraterritorial application so that courts need no longer speculate
about congressional intent.
I. EXTRA TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF RICO
Neither the text nor the legislative history of RICO indicates congressional intent regarding the statute's application
to activities that occur primarily outside U.S. borders.' 4 As a
result, courts have construed the statute and have established a
standard for applying it to RICO violations that involve nonU.S. conduct and non-U.S. actors.' 5 Because most cases regarding the extraterritoriality of federal law have involved SEA
violations, the standards established by those cases have been
13. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991) (setting forth prohibited
activities, criminal penalties, and civil remedies); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4010 (further explaining RICO).
14. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (lacking any mention of extraterritoriality); H.R.
REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007 (same).
15. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.) (setting forth standard
for extraterritorial application of RICO), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991); Parness,
503 F.2d at 439 (affirming that court can apply RICO extraterritorially); Philan, 748
F. Supp. at 194-95 (setting forth standard for extraterritorial application of RICO).

162 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL I

WJOURNAL

[Vol. 16:159

16
applied by analogy to the RICO litigation.

A. The Statutory Language and Legislative History of RICO
In passing the RICO statute, Congress sought to punish
not any single type of activity, but to penalize individuals and7
enterprises engaging in ongoing patterns of illegal activity.'
Neither the statute nor its legislative history sets forth the
method for applying RICO to transactions completed substantially outside the United States. 8 Thus, when U.S. courts be-

gan hearing cases of international RICO violations involving
non-U.S. actors and conduct outside the United States, the
courts had to interpret the statute to decide its applicability to
these cases.' 9
16. See, e.g., Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479 (using analogy to apply SEA cases to RICO
claim); Philan, 748 F. Supp. at 194 n.4 (same).
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991). The statute provides that it is
unlawful for a person, through patterns of illegal activity, to gain control of any enterprise that is involved in interstate or international commerce. Id. The statute provides that
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated
as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code,
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment
or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4010 (further explaining RICO). The statute defines "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
18. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991) (lacking any mention of
extraterritoriality); see also H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007 (same).
19. See, e.g., Alfadda, 935 F.2d 475 (interpreting extraterritorial force of RICO).
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To interpret any statute, courts must follow accepted rules
of statutory construction.20 One such rule is the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 2 1 This rule provides that, in the absence of contrary intent, U.S. statutes apply
only within the United States. 22 Courts have widely held, however, that when Congress has not explicitly expressed its intent, courts may infer an intent as to the case under consideration.23
When attempting to infer congressional intent, a court
first must examine the statute's plain language 24 to decide the
scope of the statute's application. 2 ' RICO expressly provides
that its purpose is to penalize, civilly and criminally, individuals
who earn money through illegal enterprises. 6 The statute,
however, does not directly authorize or forbid extraterritorial
application. 7
When the plain language of a statute is inconclusive, the
court must look to the statute's legislative history to decide the
congressional intent.28 Unfortunately, the legislative history of
RICO also is silent as to the extraterritorial application of the
statute. 29 Because neither the statute itself nor the legislative
20. See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

(5th ed. 1992) (explaining basic rules of statutory construction).
21. See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (referring to "canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United

States").
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (2d Cir.
1983) (stating that courts must sometimes determine congressional intent); Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
24. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01
(5th ed. 1992) (explaining plain meaning rule, which refers to actual wording of statute, understood for its explicit meaning, without reference to outside sources or inference).
25. Id.; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (noting that
language of statute controls when sufficiently clear in its context).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991), supra note 17 (reproducing
most of statute's language).

27. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
28. See, e.g., United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986) (noting that legislative
history can be legitimate guide to statutory purpose); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886
(1984) (stating that courts will first look to statutory language and then to legislative
history if statutory language is unclear).
29. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007 (lacking any mention of extraterritoriality).
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history of the statute indicates congressional intent regarding
the Act's extraterritorial application, the courts have had to
fashion a standard for applying RICO to transactions that occur predominantly outside the United States and which involve
few, if any, U.S. citizens.30
B. Judicial Interpretationsof the Extraterritorialityof Federal
Securities Laws
Because few cases have dealt with the extraterritorial application of RICO, 3 ' courts have applied legal precedents that
involve the extraterritorial application of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.32 Because many RICO violations are
based on some kind of securities fraud,3 3 courts find the two
30. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 476-78 (2d Cir.) (applying RICO to
primarily non-U.S. conduct by non-U.S. citizens), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991).
31. See Alfadda v. Fenn, 751 F. Supp. 1114, 1116-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting
lack of extraterritorial RICO precedent), rev'd, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 638 (1991). Litigants have filed approximately 16 extraterritorial RICO cases
in U.S. courts, six of which were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See Philan Ins.
Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 748 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding no jurisdiction
over non-U.S. defendants); Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
669 F. Supp. 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus.,
Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same), aff'd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987);
Huang v. Sentinel Gov't Sec., 657 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same); Ancilla
Domini Health Servs., Inc. v. Communications Assocs., Inc., No. 84-C-2771, 1985
WL 4054 (N.D. Il1. Nov. 5, 1985) (same); Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd.,
619 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
In another five cases, litigants established jurisdiction but their RICO claims
were stayed or dismissed. See Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th
Cir. 1987) (holding RICO claims barred by act of state and political question doctrines), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989); S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah
Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984) (staying RICO claims pending arbitration of
other claims); FMC Corp. v. Varonos, No. 87-C-9640, 1988 WL 116825 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 20, 1988) (finding RICO claims insufficient), aff'd, 892 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir.
1990); Selman v. American Sports Underwriters, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 225 (W.D. Va.
1988) (same); Chisholm & Co. v. Bank ofJamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(same).
Courts have maintained RICO causes of action against non-U.S. defendants only
five times. See Alfadda, 935 F.2d 475 (denying non-U.S. defendant's motion to dismiss); In re All Terrain Vehicles Litig., No. 88-237, 1989 WL 30948 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23,
1989) (same, but not addressing conduct and effects tests); Chamarac Properties,
N.V. v. Pike, No. 86-Civ.-7919, 1987 WL 20023 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1987) (same);
State of North Carolina ex rel. Long v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 680 F.
Supp. 746 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (same); Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. CIV.A.95-2925,
1986 WL 15617 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1986) (same).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991); see Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 478-79 (explaining that SEA cases are applied by analogy to RICO claims).
33. See, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Inv., Inc., 959 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1992); Alfadda, 935
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areas of law similar enough to justify the use of SEA cases as
precedent. 34 The transnational character of the securities industry has resulted in a significant amount of litigation regarding the extraterritoriality of federal securities laws, and the extraterritoriality of these laws is considered analogous to the extraterritoriality of RICO. 5
The SEA, like RICO, lacks an express indication of congressional intent regarding extraterritorial application in both
its text and its legislative history. 3 6 As a result, courts have formulated two tests by which to decide the propriety of federal
court jurisdiction over a particular claim: 3 7 the "conduct"
test3 8 and the "effects" test.3 9 If either test is satisfied, the
court may grant subject matter jurisdiction.4 °
denied,
F.2d 475; Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
111 S. Ct. 250 (1990); Street v.J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1989);
Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, N.A., 859 F.2d 865 (11th Cir. 1988);
Durham v. Business Management Assoc., 847 F.2d 1505 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Girard v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1986).
34. See, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983) (using
analogy to apply SEA cases to CEA claim); cf.Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479 (using analogy
to apply SEA cases to RICO claim).
35. See, e.g., Alfadda, 751 F. Supp. at 1116-17 (listing nine Second Circuit cases
on issue); see also H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6065-68 (observing increase of securities violations committed
through off-shore entities).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
37. See Psimenos, 722 F.2d 1041 (applying conduct test); Grunenthal GmbH v.
Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v.
Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d
109 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938
(1977); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying conduct and
effects tests); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying conduct
test).
38. See, e.g., Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334 (holding that when significant conduct occurs within United States and Congress has not clearly forbidden extraterritorial application, statute may be applied extraterritorially).
39. Id. at 1341 (holding that when acts of individual performed outside United
States cause effects within United States, jurisdiction should be granted for cause of
action arising from those effects).
40. See Continental, 592 F.2d at 417 (noting that jurisdiction requires either substantial conduct or substantial effect within United States, but not both); see also
Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1045 (holding that once jurisdiction is granted under one test, it
isunnecessary to apply other test).

166 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol.16:159
1. The Conduct Test
The conduct test requires that significant acts, furthering a
fraudulent scheme, occur in the United States before jurisdiction can be granted. 4 ' Between 1968 and 1975, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the first three cases

involving the conduct test.4 2 Judge Henry J. Friendly wrote
detailed and scholarly opinions in all three cases. 45 These
three cases have become the most significant precedents in this
area and have been cited by most courts that address the extraterritorial effect of federal securities laws.4 4
a. Early Second Circuit Precedents
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first applied the conduct test in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell.4 5 In Leasco, British defendants fraudulently induced
British plaintiff corporations to purchase stock in a British corporation. 46 Although these securities were never traded on a
U.S. market, 47 the court found that defendants had made substantial misrepresentations in the United States.4 8 Defendants'
U.S. conduct included meetings with plaintiffs in New York,
numerous telephone calls
between New York and London, and
use of the U.S. mails. 49 This conduct was adjudged sufficient
41. See, e.g., Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992-93 (explaining requirements of conduct
test).
42. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch, 519 F.2d 974;
Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326.
43. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001; Bersch, 519 F.2d 974; Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326. When
examining the development of the conduct test, it is important to remember that the
test is almost entirely based on the decisions of one judge.
44. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.) (quoting Vencap, 519
F.2d at 1018), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991); Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir.) (quoting Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985), cert.
dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989); Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1045 (citing Leasco, 468 F.2d at
1337); Continental, 592 F.2d at 413 (recognizing Judge Friendly's U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as "the Mother Court" of securities law).
45. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
46. Id. at 1330.
47. Id. at 1334.
48. Id. at 1334-35. The court stated that the misrepresentations regarded the
financial soundness of defendants' companies and that plaintiffs relied on those misrepresentations when contemplating a joint venture with those companies. Id. at
1331-32.
49. Id. at 1330-33.
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to grant federal jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims.50
The Leasco court recognized that congressional intent indicated that federal laws could be applied extraterritorially in
certain circumstances. 5' In Leasco, the court applied the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations
5
Law of the United States 52 to the issue of extraterritoriality. 3
The court acknowledged that if no fraud had been committed
within the United States, it would be difficult to justify a grant
of jurisdiction .5 4 The court held, however, that the defendants' substantial misrepresentation made in the United States,
coupled with an adverse impact on a U.S. company, were sufficient to establish jurisdiction.5 5
The elements of the conduct test were outlined by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc. 56 According to Judge Friendly, the conduct test
requires that "acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance" must occur within the United States before a court
50. Id. at 1339.
51. Id. Addressing congressional intent, the court stated that
[slince Congress thus meant § 10(b) to protect against fraud in the sale or
purchase of securities whether or not these were traded on organized
United States markets, we cannot perceive any reason why it should have
wished to limit the protection to securities of American issuers. The New
Yorker who is the object of fraudulent misrepresentations in New York is as
much injured if the securities are of a mine in Saskatchewan as in Nevada.
Id. at 1336.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES § 17 (1962) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. The Restatement (Second)
provides that
[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the
conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in
its territory.
Id. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] also recognizes the conduct test.
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) provides that "[slubject to [the reasonableness standard

of] § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (l)(a) conduct that,
wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory." Id. § 402(l)(a).
53. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334.
54. Id at 1334; see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (describing defendants' conduct).
55. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1337.
56. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
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may grant jurisdiction over a case.5 7 Bersch further limited jurisdiction to cases in which the conduct within the United
States was more than "merely preparatory. '5' The conduct
occurring in the United States, typically fraudulent statements
or misrepresentations, must directly cause the plaintiff's
losses, even if the plaintiff's reliance on the defendants' misrepresentations and the resultant losses or damages occur entirely outside the United States.59
The Bersch court denied jurisdiction under the conduct
6
test. 0 It characterized the acts occurring in the United
States 6 1 as merely preparatory and therefore not substantial
enough to support a grant of jurisdiction.6 2 The court stated
that the acts merely constituted culpable nonfeasance and were
relatively minor when compared to the acts that occurred
outside the United States.63
HT v. Vencap, Ltd. ,' decided on the same day as Bersch,
clarified the holding of Leasco. Vencap involved a venture capital firm in which plaintiffs intended to invest. 65 The controversy arose when defendants induced plaintiffs to transfer substantial amounts of money into defendants' possession. 6 6 Defendants then kept the money that plaintiffs transferred rather
than investing it on plaintiffs' behalf.6 7 Plaintiffs claimed that
they made the transfers in reliance on a false and misleading
57. Id. at 993 (stating that U.S. conduct was insufficient to establish jurisdiction,
but that non-U.S. conduct resulted in substantial effects within United States and that
jurisdiction should be granted on those grounds).
58. Id. at 987. The Bersch court found that meetings and negotiations in the
United States that preceded the actual fraud were merely preparatory and therefore
not substantial enough to confer jurisdiction. Id. at 985 n.24.
59. See, e.g., id. at 992-93 (stating that jurisdiction could be granted based on
material U.S. conduct that directly causes plaintiff's losses. even though reliance and
losses occurred outside United States); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) conduct tests, supra note 52 (reproducing language of tests in full).
60. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992.
61. See id. at 985 n.24 (stating that U.S. conduct engaged in by defendants included preliminary meetings, use of New York law firm and accounting firm, drafting
of documents in United States and use of U.S. banks).
62. Id. at 987.
63. Id.
64. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
65. Id. at 1005.
66. Id. at 1008.
67. Id.
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memorandum produced by the defendants.68
In Vencap, at least one defendant was a U.S. citizen, a
meeting regarding financial matters was held in the United
States, 69 plaintiffs and defendants both retained U.S. attorneys, 70 and various documents related to the transaction at issue were drafted in the United States. 7 ' Judge Friendly again
articulated the need for a direct causal connection between the
U.S. conduct and the plaintiffs' losses.

72

Additionally, as he

did in Leasco and implicitly in Bersch, Judge Friendly required
that actual fraudulent conduct, not merely conduct in furtherance of a fraud, occur in the United States.73 Finding these
criteria satisfied, the Second Circuit granted subject matter jurisdiction. 4
b. Other Circuits Applying the Second Circuit Standard
When deciding international securities cases, other circuits adopted the fundamental elements of the conduct test articulated by the Second Circuit. 75 They did not, however, apply the test as stringently. The Ninth, Eighth, Third, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals granted jurisdiction even when
the acts within the United States did not constitute a violation
of U.S. law. 76
68. Id. at 1011.
69. Id. at 1004. Plaintiffs were a Luxembourg trust company and three Luxembourg citizens. Id. at 1003.
70. Id. at 1005.
71. Id. at 1006.
72. Id. at 1018; see Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 34-35 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (comparing standards set by various circuits and adopting Second Circuit's as most restrictive).
73. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018 (stating that finding ofjurisdiction "is limited to
the perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves").
74. Id. at 1020-21.
75. See Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1106-08 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984) (discussing, among others, Second Circuit
precedents); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 423 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that lower court reviewed Second Circuit precedents); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 413-15 (8th Cir. 1979) (discussing, among others, Second Circuit precedents); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 112 (3d
Cir.) (listing, among others, Second Circuit precedents), cert. denied sub noma.Churchill
Forest Indus. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
76. See Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108 (requiring only conduct material to completion
of fraudulent scheme); Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 426 (not requiring violation within
United States); Continental, 592 F.2d at 418 (stating that Kasser extended liability to
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The courts based their decisions on various rationales.
The Third Circuit relied on its interpretation of congressional
intent, the language of the SEA, and policy considerations. 7 7
The Seventh Circuit based its holding on the fundamental purposes of the CEA. 7' The Eighth Circuit examined the relationship between the defendants' conduct in the United States and
the allegation of a fraudulent scheme. 79 The Ninth Circuit
combined and adopted the rationales of the Third and Eighth
Circuits.8 0 Eventually, the Second Circuit also adopted a more
liberal approach to granting jurisdiction over predominantly
non-U.S. cases. 8 '
i. The Relaxation of the Second Circuit's Test
Circuit courts have interpreted and applied the basic elements of the conduct test in a variety of ways. The Ninth,
Eighth, Third, and Seventh Circuits adopted the Second Circuit's conduct test, but applied it less strictly. 2 The following
four cases represent a relaxation of the Second Circuit's standard because they do not require that the fraudulent acts occur
in the United States. 3 Rather, the courts granted jurisdiction
when U.S. conduct substantially furthered the fraudulent
cases where U.S. conduct did not constitute violation); Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114 (stating that accomplishment of fraud is not prerequisite to liability).
77. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114, 116. Policy considerations mentioned by the court
included a desire to prevent non-U.S. citizens from using the United States as a base
of fraudulent operations, a desire to avoid reciprocal responses from other nations,
and a desire to enhance the ability of the SEC to insure high standards of conduct in
securities transactions. Id. at 116.
78. Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108.
79. Continental, 592 F.2d at 420.
80. Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 424-25.
81. See Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478-79 (2d Cir.) (applying less stringent
conduct test to RICO claim), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991); see also Psimenos v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying less stringent conduct test
to CEA claim).
82. Tamari, 730 F.2d 1103; Grunenthal, 712 F.2d 421; Continental, 592 F.2d 409;
SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. v.
SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
83. See Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108 (requiring only that conduct be material to
successful completion of alleged fraud); Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 425 (requiring only
that conduct be significant, material and in furtherance of fraudulent scheme); Continental, 592 F.2d at 421 (granting jurisdiction where defendants' conduct was significant and furthered fraudulent scheme); Kasser, 548 F.2d at 111-12 (granting jurisdiction because significant U.S. conduct formed part of defendants' scheme).
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scheme.8 4
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
GrunenthalGmbH v. Hotz, 8 5 adopted the conduct test set forth in
Bersch, but applied it somewhat less strictly. 6 In Grunenthal,
plaintiff, a German corporation, alleged that defendants, two

Bahamian corporations and a Mexican corporation, violated
the SEA by making misrepresentations in connection with the
sale of stock in one defendant corporation to plaintiff corporation. 7 The misrepresentations concerned defendants' ability
to transfer the shares and defendants' intent to perform the
agreement. 8 The U.S. conduct consisted of meetings in Los
Angeles, California during which the parties furthered the
scheme that caused plaintiff's losses.8 9 The court set forth the
elements of the conduct test gleaned from the earlier opinions.90 The test, according to Grunenthal, requires use of "instrumentalities of interstate commerce." 9' The court stressed
that defendants' use of these instrumentalities constituted sig84. See Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108 (holding that transmission of commodities orders to United States was sufficient conduct); Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 425 (holding
that misrepresentations made in United States constituted sufficient conduct); Continental, 592 F.2d at 421 (holding that use of U.S. mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce was sufficient conduct); Kasser, 548 F.2d at 111-12 (holding that various U.S. conduct furthering fraudulent scheme was sufficient).
85. 712 F.2d 421.
86. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d Cir.) (characterizing defendants' U.S. conduct as merely preparatory and relatively minor in comparison to conduct outside United States), cert. denied sub noma.
Bersch v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); cf, Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 422-23 (describing defendants' conduct, which could be described as merely preparatory and relatively minor
under Bersch).
87. Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 422.
88. Id. at 423.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 424.
91. Id. at 423-24; see Securities and Exchange Commission Rules, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240. 1Ob-5 (1991) (setting forth requirements of violation). This rule provides that
it is illegal for any person to use any instrumentality of interstate commerce, or to use
mails or any facility of a national securities exchange
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
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nificant conduct within the United States, furthering the fraudulent scheme.9 2 The court held that the requirement that the
conduct must be material, rather than merely preparatory, was
satisfied. 9 3
In Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds,
Inc. , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also
applied the conduct test.9 5 In Continental, U.S. defendants sold
stock in an Australian company to an Australian citizen. 9 6 Defendants failed to disclose material information concerning the
financial soundness of the company. 9 7 The court granted subject matter jurisdiction because the fraudulent failure to disclose began with communications in the United States. 9 8
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in SEC v.
Kasser,99 required only that some of the activity furthering the
fraudulent scheme occur within the United States.10 0 In Kasser,
defendants' U.S. conduct caused losses to a Canadian corporation.' ° ' The U.S. conduct included various meetings and negotiations in the United States, execution of a contract in New
York, use of the U.S. wires and mails, incorporation of two defendant companies in the United States, and use of the U.S.
branch of a Swiss bank as a conduit for fraudulently received
funds. 10 2 The court granted jurisdiction because the defendants furthered their fraudulent scheme through these activities
03
within the United States.1
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L. ,104 decided by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, represents a
92. Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 423. Although the court did not specify, one might
assume that the defendants used U.S. wires and mails in connection with a meeting in
Los Angeles. Id.
93. Id. at 426.
94. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
95. Id. at 415-16.
96. Id. at 411.
97. Id. at 411-13.
98. Id. at 420.
99. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. v. SEC,
431 U.S. 938 (1977).
100. Id. at 114.
101. Id. at 111.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 111-12.
104. 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).
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particularly lenient application of the conduct test.' 015
Although the case involved a violation of the CEA,' °6 the
court, by analogizing to the more extensively litigated securities cases, applied the conduct test.'0 7 Plaintiffs were citizens
of Lebanon and defendant was a Lebanese corporation wholly
owned by a U.S. corporation.' 0 8 Defendant solicited and
traded on plaintiffs' commodities accounts. 0 9 The violations
alleged included excessive trading, misrepresentations concerning the condition of plaintiffs' accounts, and false reports
given to plaintiffs by defendant."t 0 The only U.S. conduct alleged was the transmission of commodities futures orders to
U.S. exchanges."' The Tamari court decided that this conduct
was sufficient to confer jurisdiction because this holding would
is to enfurther the fundamental purpose of the CEA, which
2
sure the integrity of U.S. commodities markets."
ii. The U.S. Court of the Appeals for the District of
Columbia Applying the Early Second Circuit
Standard
In Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co. ,"11 the U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia adopted the early Second
Circuit standard for applying the conduct test." 4 Zoelsch involved a non-U.S. plaintiff and a U.S. defendant corporation. 11 5 Plaintiff and other non-U.S. citizens invested in a tax
shelter plan set up by two non-U.S. companies and a U.S. company." l6 Plaintiff alleged that defendant provided false and
misleading statements to the other companies, knowing that
these companies would use the information in reports distributed to plaintiff and the other investors."I7 The Zoelsch court
expressed doubt as to whether a U.S. court should ever grant
105. Id. at 1108.
106. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988).
107.
108.
109.
110.

Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108.
Id.
Id. at 1105.
Id.

111. Id. at 1108.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 28.
Id. These three companies were not defendants in this action. Id. at 29.
Id.
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jurisdiction over a case when the injured parties are non-U.S.
citizens." 8 However, noting the Second Circuit's preeminence
in the field of securities law and desiring to avoid multiplicity
of standards among the circuits, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the conduct test as enunciated in Bersch." 9 The
court held that this test required that the fraudulent statements
connected to the purchase or sale of securities originate in the
United States, that the statements be made with scienter, and
that the statements directly cause plaintiff's losses.12 0 In other
words, the Zoelsch court adopted the Second Circuit requirement that the U.S. conduct must establish an actionable violation of the securities laws. 2 ' Holding that these criteria were
not satisfied, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over
22
plaintiff's claims.'
c. Second Circuit's Adoption of the More Liberal Standard
The most recent Second Circuit case applying the conduct
test is Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co..1 2 3 In Psimenos, the court
granted subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint by a nonU.S. investor against a U.S. commodities broker. 24 Psimenos,
like Tamari, involved a violation of the CEA.' 25 Defendant's
advertisements stated that its commodities trading accounts
were handled in accordance with the CEA, that defendant's
money managers were experienced, and the quality of their
work was thoroughly evaluated. 2 6 Relying on these representations, plaintiff opened an account with defendant's Athens
office.12 7 Although plaintiff directed defendant to seek only
conservative investments, defendant used plaintiff's money to
participate in several high-risk ventures. 2 8 As a result, plaintiff incurred substantial losses. 12 9 Defendant also made bogus
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 34.
722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1042-43.
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1043.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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trades on plaintiff's account to generate commissions. 3 1
Plaintiff eventually lost in excess of US$200,000.'31
The misrepresentations made by defendant to plaintiff occurred almost entirely outside the United States. 3 2 The only
U.S. conduct alleged by plaintiff was that the commodities
were traded on a U.S. market. 3 3 Although the activity of trading commodities on a U.S. market was, of itself, entirely legal
and the plaintiff was a non-U.S. investor, the trading furthered
a fraudulent scheme outside the United States.' 34 The Second
Circuit found that this minimal U.S. activity satisfied the3 conduct test and, therefore, the court granted jurisdiction. 1
2. The Effects Test
A necessary corollary to the conduct test is the effects
test. 3 6 First applied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, the effects test requires that non-U.S. conduct directly result in a substantial and
foreseeable effect within the United States before a court may
grant jurisdiction.13 8 In Schoenbaum, the Canadian defendants
130. Id. at 1044.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1046-48.
135. Id. The court applied the less restrictive test while not expressly overturning Judge Friendly's earlier Second Circuit precedents. Id.
136. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.) (setting forth basic
elements of effects test), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
137. Id.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 18 recognizes the effects test; see

supra note 52 and accompanying text (recognizing conduct test). The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) provides that

[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it
occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 52, § 18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(1)(c) also
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sold stock in Canada, resulting in a fluctuation of the stock's
price on the American Stock Exchange. 3 9 The court deemed
this effect substantial enough to justify granting subject matter
140
jurisdiction.
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. ,'4 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also applied the effects test. After
denying jurisdiction under the conduct test, the Bersch court
held that the effects test had been met. 42 Bersch involved a
number of U.S. and non-U.S. investors who purchased stock in
several non-U.S. companies. 11 3 Although the offering prospectus excluded U.S. citizens from investing,' 4 4 many U.S. citizens or residents did invest.' 45 As a result of defendants'
fraudulent actions, the value of plaintiff's shares dropped so
drastically that they became virtually unsaleable. 1 46 The court
held that the conduct within the United States was "merely
preparatory," yet the losses to the U.S. investors constituted a
substantial enough effect to allow the U.S. court to exercise
47
subject matter jurisdiction.
In Tamari,'14 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit granted jurisdiction under the conduct test, but also
held that the effects test had been met. 49 Similar to
Schoenbaum, the court in Tamari found that the facts satisfied
recognizes the effects test. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52. The RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) provides that
[slubject to [the reasonableness requirement of] § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe
(1)(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.
Id.
139. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204-09.
140. Id. at 208.
141. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.Bersch v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
142. Id. at 992-93.
143. Id. at 979-80.
144. Id. at 980.
145. Id. at 992 n.42 (stating that approximately 385 "American persons" had
acquired shares).
146. Id. at 981.
147. Id. at 992.
148. 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); see supra notes
104-12 and accompanying text (discussing application of conduct test in Tamayi).
149. Id. at 1108.
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the effects test because of trading activity on a U.S. market.

50

The Tamari court held that because fraudulent transactions artificially influenced the markets, jurisdiction was appropriate
under the effects test.' 5 '
More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit applied the effects test in ConsolidatedGold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A. 152 In Consolidated, U.S. investors, representing a
very small percentage of the affected shareholders, held stock
valued at approximately US$120,000,000.' 5 The court held
that an investment of this size would have an effect within the
United States substantial enough to-satisfy the requirements of
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.
While Psimenos represents a relaxation of the Second
Circuit's standard for applying the conduct test, Consolidatedreflects a similar relaxation of the effects test standard.'
C. Judicial Interpretations of RICO's ExtraterritorialEffect
Very few cases address the extraterritorial application of
RICO. 5 6 United States v. Parness157 and Philan Insurance Ltd. v.
Frank B. Hall & Co. 158 are two significant extraterritorial RICO
cases. Parness addressed RICO's extraterritoriality based on an
interpretation of the Act's language and legislative history' 59
and Philan followed the conduct and effects formulations set
forth in Vencap, Bersch, and Leasco. t 6°
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 939 (1989); see William R.
Covey, Comment, Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A.: The Extraterritorial
Application of United States Securities Laws in InternationalEquities Markets, 14 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 240 (1990-1991) (arguing that Consolidated impermissibly relaxed standard
for jurisdiction under effects test).
153. Consolidated, 871 F.2d at 262 (stating that U.S. residents represented 2.5
percent of shareholders).
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text (describing conduct adjudged sufficient for jurisdiction in Psimenos).
156. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975); Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 748 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); see supra note 31 (listing 16 extraterritorial RICO cases).
157. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
158. 748 F. Supp. 190.
159. Parness, 503 F.2d at 438-39.
160. See id. at 440 (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972)); Philan, 748 F. Supp. at 193 (citing Bersch v. Drexel Fire-
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
Parness only two years after Leasco and one year prior to Bersch
and Vencap. 61 Although Judge Friendly did not write for the
court, he joined in its decision. 6 2 Thus, one may assume that
the circumstances within Parness satisfied the strict Second Circuit standard formulated by Judge Friendly.
In Parness, defendants faced criminal charges of conver6
sion and transportation of stolen money across state lines.' 3
In addition, a RICO claim arose from the allegation that the
U.S. defendants had used the stolen money to divest the U.S.
plaintiff of his interest in a non-U.S. corporation. 16 Defendants asserted that, because the corporation was not subject to
65
U.S. laws, RICO should not apply to this acquisition.
In Parness, the court addressed defendants' contention
that RICO was not intended to apply to the wrongful acquisition of a non-U.S. corporation.166 The court relied on RICO's
legislative history to reject this argument and granted jurisdiction.' 6 7 The court referred to the civil provisions of RICO, 68
which were intended to protect individuals who invest in U.S.
and non-U.S. ventures.' 6 9 Although civil liability was not an
issue in this case, the court's reference to the civil provisions of
RICO is significant because the complainant was a U.S. citizen
who owned a non-U.S. corporation. 7 ° Thus, the Second Circuit, through Parness, made it clear that RICO could be con17 1
strued to have substantial extraterritorial effect.
Philan, a civil RICO case, was decided by the U.S. District
stone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975)).
161. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch, 519 F.2d 974;
Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326.
162. Parness, 503 F.2d at 432.
163. Id. at 433.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 439.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4033 (stating that any wrongful acquisition, without exception, is
prohibited).
168. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
169. Parness, 503 F.2d at 439.
170. Id. at 433.
171. Id. at 439.
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Court for the Southern District of New York.' 72 Philan involved a scheme in which defendants arranged to take in premiums owed to plaintiff insurance companies, keep ten percent
for themselves, and transfer only the remaining ninety percent
to plaintiffs.'M Defendants transmitted the misappropriated
funds through and from New York and created74and transmitted fraudulent records in and from New York.'
In Philan, the court denied subject matter jurisdiction
under both the conduct and effects tests.' 75 However, because
the facts do not satisfy even the more relaxed requirements for
extraterritoriality, this case does not represent a departure
from the recent, less stringent standard. 176 In Philan, the district court first examined plaintiffs' claims under the conduct
test.' 7 7 Although this conduct furthered the fraud,

78

the court

denied subject matter jurisdiction because these actions did
not directly cause plaintiffs' losses.' 79 Turning to the effects
test, the court also denied jurisdiction on that ground. 8 0
Plaintiffs argued that because defendants had violated federal
Delaw, the requirements of the effects tests had been met.'
nying jurisdiction under the effects test, the court recognized
that accepting plaintiffs' argument would diminish the effects
that plaintiffs had a
test to nothing more than a determination
182
cognizable claim under federal law.
172. Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co. 748 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
173. Id. at 192.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 194-95.
176. Id. at 191-93; see supra notes 75-112 and accompanying text (discussing
more relaxed standard).
177. Philan, 748 F. Supp. at 194.
178. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975) (limitingjurisdiction to perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves); cf Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (requiring only substantial conduct in furtherance of
fraud).
179. Philan, 748 F. Supp. at 194; see Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1046 (requiring that
U.S. conduct directly cause plaintiff's losses); see also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. dnied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423
U.S. 1018 (1975) (same).
180. Philan, 748 F. Supp. at 195.
181. Id. at 194.
182. Id. at 194-95.
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II. ALFADDA v. FENN
In Alfadda v. Fenn,'"s the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit again addressed the extraterritorial application
of RICO, but this time granted jurisdiction based on the conduct test.' 84 Alfadda involved an allegedly fraudulent sale of
securities to plaintiffs, a group of non-U.S. residents. 1 85 The
sale was made outside the United States and the company for
86
which the securities were issued was a non-U.S. corporation.1
Plaintiffs alleged that, in contravention of the offering prospectus, defendants made a second offering that diluted plaintiffs'
voting rights.18 7 Plaintiffs contended that the U.S. court
should confer jurisdiction over this case because substantial
conduct leading up to the second sale of securities occurred in
the United States. 8 8 The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied jurisdiction under both the conduct 8 9 and the effects tests. 90 However, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that defendants' U.S. activities satisfied the conduct test.' 9 '
A. Factual Background
On February 14, 1979, defendant Radwan, a U.S. citizen,
invited plaintiff Alfadda 19 2 to purchase shares in defendant
company, Saudi European Investment Corporation N.V.
("SEIC").' 9 3 Later that year, plaintiff Alfadda purchased 1000
shares of SEIC stock for US$1,000,000.194 Several other investors also purchased substantial amounts of SEIC stock.' 9 5 Ac183. 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1991).
184. Id. at 479.
185. Id. at 476.
186. Id. at 477.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Alfadda v. Fenn, 751 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 935 F.2d
475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991).
190. Id. at 1118-19.
191. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 480.
192. Id. at 476-77.
193. Id. All plaintiffs are non-U.S. residents and nationals of either Saudi Arabia
or Bahrain. Id. SEIC is incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles. Id.
194. Id. at 477.
195. Id. Plaintiffs Abdulla Kanoo, Abdulaziz Kanoo and Yusif Bin Ahmed (the
Kanoos) purchased 10,000 shares for US$1,000,000; plaintiffs Ahmed Zainy and
Abdullah Abbar each purchased 10,000 shares for US$1,000,000. Id.
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cording to the terms of the original offering prospectus, plaintiff Alfadda and the other original investors were to receive
preference in any subsequent offering of SEIC stock.' 96 In addition, the prospectus guaranteed that any subsequent offering
would 7 not dilute the voting interests of the original investors.

9

In 1983, defendant Radwan and defendant Fenn, a U.S.
citizen and resident, planned a second offering of SEIC
stock.'9 8 The chairman of the U.S.-based American Continental notified SEIC that American Continental's savings and loan
subsidiary, Lincoln Savings and Loan Association ("Lincoln"),
wanted to purchase fifteen percent of SEIC's voting shares.' 99
Six days later, American Continental received a telex in Phoenix, Arizona from SEIC directing it to deposit payment for the
shares in a New York bank account.200 Subsequently, defendants met with American Continental's chairman in Phoenix,
Arizona.2 ° ' One week after the meeting, a SEIC employee,
hired by defendants to market the second offering, received a
telex from defendant Fenn informing him that the
US$18,000,000 from American Continental had finally arrived.20 2
SEIC's offering prospectus included a clause prohibiting
direct or indirect offerings in the United States. 2 ' To circumvent this clause, American Continental created Lincoln American Investments N.V. ("Lincoln American"). 20 4 Lincoln Amer-

ican was a wholly-owned, subsidiary, off-shore shell company
created solely for the purpose of purchasing shares in SEIC.2 °5
In addition, plaintiffs alleged that in June of 1984, defendant Radwan telephoned another potential investor, Mr. Al196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 477 n.6. Defendant Fenn said that the meeting was unrelated to
SEIC, but that he could not remember the topics discussed. Id. This is significant
because if the meeting concerned SEIC it would be additional U.S. conduct in furtherance of the fraud on plaintiffs. Id.
202. Id. at 477.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 479. Lincoln American is incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles.
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Turki, in Houston, Texas 20 6 to notify him of Lincoln American's purchase and to suggest that, if Mr. Al-Turki bought a
large amount of stock, then Mr. Al-Turki, defendants Radwan
and Fenn and another original investor would control SEIC. °7
Plaintiffs alleged that the SEIC employee hired to market the
second offering telexed Mr. AI-Turki on June 22 to ask if Mr.
Al-Turki intended to invest. 20 8 Mr. Al-Turki replied by telex
that he would purchase 150,000 shares for US$15,000,000.20 9
On June 26, SEIC accepted Mr. Al-Turki's offer by telex, and
directed him to deposit payment in its New York bank ac210
count.
The parties did not dispute that the sales to Lincoln American and Mr. Al-Turki caused losses to plaintiffs by diluting
their voting rights. 2 1 ' The only controversy concerned the significance of defendants' conduct within the United States.21 2
There were several significant U.S. activities in Alfadda v. Fenn.
Most importantly, defendants Radwan and Fenn were both
U.S. citizens.21 3
Plaintiffs alleged additional U.S. conduct that defendants
did not dispute. The second offering was planned and completed almost entirely within the United States.21 4 The SEIC
employee, a U.S. citizen, prepared and marketed the second
offering. 21 5 Shares were sold in the United States to Lincoln
American 21 6 and to Mr. Al-Turki, whose company had offices
in the United States.21 7 Furthermore, defendants repeatedly
used U.S. mail, wire, and telephone services to arrange the second sale.2 "8 The stock certificates issued in that sale were
206. Id. at 478 n.7. AI-Turki is a resident of Saudi Arabia and he owns a Saudi

company with offices in Houston. Id.
207. Id. at 477.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 478.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 477.
212. Id. at 477 n.4.
213. Alfadda v. Fenn, 751 F. Supp. 1114, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 935 F.2d
475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991).
214. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 477.
215. Alfadda, 751 F. Supp. at 1116.
216. Id.
217. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 477 n.7.
218. Alfadda, 751 F. Supp. at 1116.
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printed in New York.219 Meetings prior to the sale were held at
several U.S. locations.220 Of particular significance are the deof monies used to purchase shares in
posits made in U.S. banks
221
the second offering.
Plaintiffs also claimed that this second offering was made
in contravention of the original offering prospectus.222 Defendants contended, however; that the fraud was complete
upon the delivery of the original prospectus to plaintiffs.223
Because that delivery occurred outside the United States, defendants asserted that the U.S. activity was inconsequential in
this case.224
B. Opinion of the U.S. District Courtfor the Southern
District of New York
Following the sales to Lincoln American and Mr. Al-Turki,
plaintiffs brought a suit for damages against defendants in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. 2 5
Count I of the complaint alleged RICO violations. 26 Count II
alleged violations of the SEA, Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission Rules 2 2 7 common law fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and rescission of contract. 2 8 Defendants
moved for dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or, in the alternative, on the grounds offorum non
conveniens .229 Defendants also moved to have the complaint
20
dismissed for failure to plead fraud with particularity.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638
(1991).
223. Id. at 478.
224. Id. at 477 n.4.
225. Alfadda, 751 F. Supp. at 1115. The original complaint was filed on September 20, 1989. Id. OnJune 29, 1990, following limited discovery on the jurisdictional

issue, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Id.
226. Id. at 1115. Count I was joined by all plaintiffs. Id.
227. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991); see supra note 91 (reproducing language of
Rule lOb-5).
228. A4fadda, 751 F. Supp. at 1115. Count II was joined by all plaintiffs except
Alfadda. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. As a result, it did not address defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to
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Stating that there was a great deal more authority on the
extraterritorial application of the securities laws than on
RICO, the district court addressed the SEA violations before
the RICO violation.2 3 ' Applying the conduct test, the court
found that the U.S. conduct in this case was even less significant than that declared insufficient in Bersch.232 The court held
that the fraud was complete once the plaintiffs paid for their
SEIC shares in reliance on the original prospectus." 3 Therefore, according to the district court, the subsequent U.S. activity leading up to the sales to Lincoln American and Mr. AlTurki was of no legal significance.2 34
Having declined to grant jurisdiction under the conduct
test, the district court then applied the effects test. 2 35 The
court found that plaintiffs were not U.S. investors, nor were
the stocks ever traded on a U.S. exchange.2 3 6 As a result, the
court held that there was no domestic effect substantial enough
to justify a grant of jurisdiction. 3 7
In addressing the RICO claims contained in Count I, the
court again denied jurisdiction. 3 8 Noting the dearth of extraterritorial RICO precedent,2 3 9 the court applied the standard
conduct and effects analysis. 4 ° It concluded that the U.S. activities, such as the use of U.S. communication and transportation systems, were "subsidiary" to the actual fraud, which ocplead fraud with particularity and to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
Id. at 1122-23.
231. Id.at 1116.
232. Id. at 1118. The conduct found insufficient in Bersch included numerous
meetings in New York attended by U.S. citizens, the involvement of U.S. law firms
and accountants, the drafting of documents in New York, telephone calls from New
York to Geneva, and the use of U.S. bank accounts. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974, 985 n.24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). This conduct was adjudged to be merely preparatory and
ancillary to the work later done in Europe. Id. at 985 n.24, 987.
233. Alfadda, 751 F. Supp. at 1118.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1119.
237. Id. at 1118-19.
238. Id. at 1122.
239. Id. at 1119; see United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); see also supra notes 156-82 and accompanying text (discussing extraterritorial RICO cases).
240. Alfadda, 751 F. Supp. at 1119.
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curred entirely outside the United States. 24 ' The court then
held that when the pattern of activity is not part of the underlying fraud "but an after-the-event working out of an already
completed fraud," a court should not grant subject matter jurisdiction. 42
The district court also held that the U.S. conduct did not
directly cause plaintiffs' losses.243 These losses, according to
the court, were a direct result of the fraudulent statements
contained in the original offering prospectus, which had no
connection to the United States.244 This analysis represented
24 5
an extremely strict application of the conduct test.

C. Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. 246 They based their appeal on the theory that
the U.S. conduct resulting in the sales to Lincoln American
and Mr. Al-Turki constituted a necessary part of the alleged
securities fraud.2 4 7 The plaintiffs contended that, in fact, these
sales consummated the fraud. 248 Reversing the district court's
dismissal of the complaint, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the acts within the United States were
necessary elements of the fraud and, as such, could serve as the
basis for subject matter jurisdiction.24 9
Addressing the general issue of the extraterritorial application of the RICO statute, the court quoted from United States
v. Parness.250 In Parness, the Second Circuit held that restricting
the application of RICO to wholly domestic enterprises would
frustrate "the salutary purposes of the Act."' 25 '

Having af-

241. Id. at 1121. The court emphasized its position by stating that "[t]he tail
should not wag the dog." Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 476 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 628

(1991).
247. Id. at 478-79.
248. Id. at 478.
249. Id. at 480.
250. Id. at 479 (quoting United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975)); see supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text (discussing Parness).
251. Parness, 503 F.2d at 439.
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firmed the possibility that RICO could reach beyond the borders of the United States, the Alfadda court granted jurisdiction
based on its analysis of the facts, in light of the accepted con25 2
duct and effects tests.
The appellate court based its reversal of the district court
on its belief that the fraud was still incomplete upon delivery of
the original prospectus to plaintiffs.2 5 3 Rather, the court of appeals considered the negotiations with and the sales to Lincoln
American and Mr. Al-Turki, which occurred primarily in the
United States, necessary elements of the fraud. 5 4 In support
of this assertion, the court stressed that RICO violations are
based, above all, on patterns of illegal activity.2 5 5 The appellate court viewed the original sale and the subsequent sales as
part of the same pattern of activity that resulted, ultimately, in
losses to the plaintiffs.2 5 6
The court of appeals also stressed procedural considerations. It noted that, because Alfadda was before the district
court on a motion to dismiss, the district court was required to
accept all of the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true. 257 The
court of appeals stated that if the district court had followed
this procedural rule, it would have found sufficient conduct to
grant jurisdiction. 2 58 For the foregoing reasons, the court of
appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.2 5 9
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY GRANTED
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
In Alfadda, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir252. Afadda, 935 F.2d at 479.
253. Id. at 478-79.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 479; see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assoc., 483 U.S. 143,
154 (1987). In Agency Holding, the Court stated that "the heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of racketeering activity." Id.
256. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 478-79.
257. Id. at 478; see 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350, at 220 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining that uncontroverted
factual allegations in body of complaint must be taken as true on disposition of motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
258. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 478.
259. Id. at 480.
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cuit properly granted subject matter jurisdiction. 26 ° The court
applied a slightly more relaxed version of the early Second Circuit SEA cases to this civil RICO claim.26 ' Although the court
did not require that the U.S. conduct itself constitute an actionable violation, it did require that the conduct be substantial
and directly cause plaintiffs' losses.262
The result in Alfadda is consistent with the need to preserve the integrity of the United States and the principles of
predictability of application, international comity, and the desire to limit the burden on the federal judiciary. Allowing the
various circuit courts to set their own standards, however, will
serve only to confuse the issue. For that reason, Congress
should establish a uniform standard for the extraterritorial application of federal statutes and thereby prevent the need for
the judicial activism which has dominated this area of the law.
A. The Second Circuit Correctly Applied Judicial Precedents
The Second Circuit correctly applied the judicial precedents to the facts ofAlfadda. Defendants' actions in the United
States were varied and substantial. 6 3 All the U.S. conduct directly resulted in the dilution of plaintiffs' voting rights and
therefore caused losses to the plaintiffs. 64 Plaintiffs proved
that defendants used U.S. wires and mails and conducted
meetings in the United States. 65
1. Jurisdiction Was Appropriately Denied Under
the Effects Test
The Second Circuit addressed the effects test in a cursory
manner in the Alfadda opinion. 66 The district court, however,
had applied this test, reaching an appropriate outcome.267
The district court denied jurisdiction under the effects test because the plaintiffs were not U.S. investors and the securities
260. Id. at 479-80.
261. See id. at 478 (adopting more relaxed standard); cf. supra notes 45-74 and
accompanying text (discussing early Second Circuit precedents).
262. A/fadda, 935 F.2d at 478.
263. Alfadda v. Fenn, 751 F. Supp. 1114, 1115-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 935
F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991).
264. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 477-79.
265. See id. at 477-78 (describing defendants' U.S. conduct).
266. Id. at 478.
267. A/fadda, 751 F. Supp. at 1118-19.
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involved were not traded on a U.S. market. 268 As a result,
there was no substantial effect on the U.S. economy or on any
U.S. citizen. If the court had granted jurisdiction under the
effects test, it would have impermissibly relaxed the standard
269
for extraterritoriality.
2. Jurisdiction Was Appropriately Granted Under the
Conduct Test
The Second Circuit granted subject matter jurisdiction in
Alfadda based on its analysis and application of the conduct
test. 2 70 The Second Circuit held that the conduct test was satisfied because defendants' U.S. activities were more than
merely preparatory and these activities directly caused plaintiffs' losses. 2 7 ' Defendants' U.S. conduct included negotiations
and meetings in the United States, use of the U.S. wires and
mails and, ultimately, the sale of securities to Lincoln American and Mr. Al-Turki.2 72 This conduct could not be characterized as merely preparatory because it was necessary to the consummation of the fraud.2 7 3 But for the conduct of the defendants within the United States and the resultant sales to Lincoln
American and Mr. Al-Turki, plaintiffs would have suffered no
losses.2 7 4 Thus, the Second Circuit was correct in granting jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims based on defendants' substantial activities within the United States.
B. Implications of Alfadda v. Fenn
The current conduct test employed by the Second Circuit
represents a significant change from the test enunciated by the
same court many years ago in Vencap, Bersch, and Leasco.275 As
268. Id. at 1119.
269. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262-63
(2d Cir.) (setting forth standard for jurisdiction under effects test), cert. dismissed, 492
U.S. 939 (1989).
270. Alfadda, 751 F. Supp. at 1118-19.
271. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638
(1991).
272. Id. at 477-78.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that
jurisdiction may be granted only when perpetration of fraudulent acts occurs within
United States); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cii.) (denying
jurisdiction where acts are preparatory), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Ander-
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explained earlier, several circuits applied the test less stringently than did the Second Circuit, often preserving all the elements of the test except for the requirement that the U.S. conduct itself constitute a violation. 6 In keeping with the more
liberal formulation of the conduct test, the Second Circuit decided Psimenos, which specifically repudiated the requirement
that the domestic activity itself constitute a violation in CEA
cases.2 77 The more recent rule, set forth in Psimenos, and followed in Alfadda, preserves the most important elements of
Vencap, Bersch, and Leasco .278 The new standard requires substantial and material conduct which actually furthers the fraudulent scheme and directly causes the plaintiffs' losses.2 7 9
Though less restrictive than the earlier rule, this new standard
sufficiently balances the competing interests in any predominantly non-U.S. securities transaction that involves some
amount of U.S. conduct.28 °
While Psimenos set the standard for granting jurisdiction
over CEA claims, the decision in Alfadda expanded RICO's extraterritorial effect beyond the earlier RICO cases, United States
v. Parness and Philan InsuranceLtd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co. 281 Parsen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that jurisdiction would be granted
only if U.S. conduct was fraudulent); see also Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824
F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that early Second Circuit rule requires that U.S.
conduct comprise all elements necessary to establish violation of § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5).
276. See Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th
Cir.) (granting jurisdiction where only U.S. conduct was transmission of fraudulent
commodities orders to U.S. exchange), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); Grunenthal
GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1983) (requiring no violation within
United States); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592
F.2d 409, 418 (8th Cir. 1979) (adopting Kasser holding that extended jurisdiction to
cases where U.S. conduct did not constitute Rule lob-5 violation); SEC v. Kasser, 548
F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.) (stating that accomplishment of fraud is not prerequisite to
liability), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
277. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir. 1983)
(explaining that district court erred in requiring that U.S. conduct itself be illegal).
278. See Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 478 (preserving requirements of materiality and
direct causation); Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1046 (same).
279. A/fadda, 935 F.2d at 478; Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1046.
280. See infra notes 289-335 and accompanying text (describing policy considerations).
281. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975); Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 748 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); see supra notes 156-82 and accompanying text (discussing Parness and Philan).
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ness did not involve a RICO claim grounded in securities fraud,
so it is not directly analogous to Alfadda. 2 82 Nor did Parness
address the conduct and effects tests. 28 3 The Parness court focused solely on whether RICO applied to the wrongful acquisition of non-U.S. businesses.2 8 4 Philan is a district court case in
which the court denied jurisdiction because the U.S. conduct
did not meet even the more relaxed standard, so its precedential value is limited. 285 However, Philan and Parness are worthy
of mention because they illustrate how vital and necessary
clear standards on the issue of RICO's extraterritoriality have
become.2 8 6
Alfadda is thus a significant decision because it is the first
case to apply the conduct and effects tests and grant jurisdic-

tion over a RICO claim based on a transnational securities
fraud where the U.S. conduct itself did not comprise all the
elements necessary to complete the fraud. Alfadda applied the
conduct and effects tests to the extraterritorial application of
the RICO statute and granted jurisdiction, while most earlier
cases dealt solely with the extraterritoriality of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934287 and the Commodities Exchange

Act. 88 The expansion of broad extraterritorial application to
another federal statute may prompt Congress to address the
issue.

282. See Parness, 503 F.2d at 433 (stating that RICO claim was based on criminal
charges of conversion and interstate transportation of stolen property rather than
securities violation).
283. See generally Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (granting jurisdiction solely on language
and legislative history of statute without applying conduct and effects tests).
284. Id. at 438-39.
285. Philan, 748 F. Supp. 190.
286. See Parness, 503 F.2d at 438-39 (finding that RICO could be construed to
apply extraterritorially); Philan, 748 F. Supp. at 194-95 (applying conduct and effects
standard of extraterritoriality to RICO claim).
287. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991); see, e.g., Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz,
712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983) (involving SEA violation); Continental Grain (Australia)
Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); SEC v. Kasser,
548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. v. SEC, 431
U.S. 938 (1977); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (same).
288. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988); see, e.g., Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L.,
730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984) (involving CEA violation);
Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983) (same).
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Another implication of this decision is the possibility that
it will further encourage international business transactions.
Scrupulous business people contemplating transnational ventures will be secure in the knowledge that RICO will protect
them from fraud and criminal activity. The increasingly international character of modern business transactions makes this
kind of security an important consideration.
C. Policy ConsiderationsSupport Broad ExtraterritorialApplication
of RICO
Several policy considerations support the argument that
RICO should be given broad extraterritorial effect. First, and
perhaps most important, is the fact that aggressive application.
of RICO to transnational schemes will help to preserve the integrity of the United States. Second, broad construction of
RICO will enhance predictability of the Act's application.
Third, such application will not violate principles of international comity. Fourth, a liberal construction will not result in
an undue burden on the federal judiciary.
1. Broad Application Will Preserve U.S. Integrity
The United States, as a world leader, has a responsibility
to help prevent international fraudulent schemes. 28 9 The in-

creasingly transnational character of the securities industry
makes it quite common for non-U.S. transactions to have some
connection with the United States. 2 90 To prevent non-U.S.

parties from acting within U.S. territory to advance their illegal
schemes, RICO and the U.S. federal securities laws must reach
those actors whose activities include U.S. conduct or result in
U.S. effects. Substantial extraterritorial application will also
protect non-U.S. parties from fraudulent schemes perpetrated
by U.S. citizens.
If U.S. laws were applied only domestically, the global
span of many RICO schemes would allow defendants to evade
prosecution. 29 1 This evasion would impair the ability of the
289. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116.

290. See generally Internationalization Report Sent to Congress by SEC Staff, 19 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 32, at 1187 (Aug. 7, 1987) (discussing increasing internationalization of securities markets).
291. Cf ALAN V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDIC'TIoN 5 (1983) (stating that
limiting reach of antitrust laws would permit defendants to evade those laws).
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United States to protect its citizens from fraud. 9 2 This significant national interest justifies broad applicability of RICO to
non-U.S. transactions that include U.S. conduct or U.S. effects.295

Most circuits addressing the extraterritorial application of
securities regulations have alluded to a desire to prevent the

United States from being used as a "base of operations" for
fraudulent activity.2 94 These courts agree that the best way to
avoid this result-is to give the securities regulations substantial
extraterritorial effect. The same can be said for RICO, which

targets patterns of illegal or fraudulent activities as opposed to
single instances. Defendants should not be permitted to es-

cape liability for fraudulent conduct in the United States simply because the resultant losses occur entirely outside the
United States and the parties adversely affected are non-U.S.
citizens. Actions within the United States that further a fraudulent scheme, regardless of the location of their effects, are
within the purview of U.S. federal regulation.295
292. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.) (stating that
Congress intended SEA to have extraterritorial application to protect U.S. investors),
rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
293. See Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, Economic and PoliticalAspects of Extraterritoriality,
19 Ihr'L LAw. 887, 888-89 (1985). Judge Dam states that

the legal regime of antitrust and securities and commodities market regulation could be undermined if transactions across borders were beyond the
reach of our legal system. National security might be eroded if we could
reach only the initial consignee of a sensitive export and had no right to
impose foreign end-use or end-user restrictions.
Id.
294. See, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir.
1983) (stating that "Congress did not want United States commodities markets to be
used as a base to consummate schemes concocted abroad"); see also Grunenthal
GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that denial ofjurisdiction

"could make it convenient for foreign citizens and corporations to use [the United
States] and its lawyers, accountants and underwriters to further fraudulent securities
schemes"); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.) (denial of jurisdiction might
encourage "those who wish to defraud foreign securities purchasers or sellers to use
the United States as a base of operations"), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); cf. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d
Cir. 1975) (asserting that Congress did not want "to allow the United States to be
used as base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when
these are peddled only to foreigners").
295. See generally Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
638 (1991).
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2. Broad Application Will Enhance Predictability
As long as U.S. courts are willing to grant subject matter
jurisdiction over a broad range of international transactions,
non-U.S. citizens conducting business within the United States
will be on notice that their actions could make"them vulnerable
to suit in a U.S. court. 29 6 The RICO statute itself repeatedly
2 97
makes reference to interstate and international commerce.
These references put individuals on notice that transactions
which cross national boundaries will be regulated by the statute. Non-U.S. citizens who voluntarily establish contacts
within the United States should foresee the possibility that U.S.
law will apply to their transactions.2 98 This foreseeability will
likely result in non-U.S. citizens being careful to respect U.S.
laws and will make it fair for U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction
over their activities.2 9 9
3. Broad Application Will Not Violate Principles of
International Comity
The policy of international comity, or the respect of one
nation for the official acts of another, supports a broad extraterritorial application of the RICO statute. 0 °6 Under RICO,
some element of interstate or international commerce must be
present before the statute can apply either within the United
States or outside its borders. 3° ' These jurisdictional limitations decrease the likelihood that U.S. litigation will infringe
296. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984) (stating that U.S. jurisdiction over non-U.S. corporation is fair when controversy arises out of defendant's contacts with United States).
297. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a),(b),(c) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
298. See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (holding that defendant's contacts with
forum will form basis of U.S. jurisdiction over defendant).
299. Id.
300. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543-44 n.27 (1987). The U.S.
Supreme Court defines international comity as "the spirit of cooperation in which a
domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests
of other sovereign states." Id. at 543 n.27. Black's Law Dictionary defines "comity of
nations" as "[t]he recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." BLAcK's lAw DICTIONARY 267 (6th
ed. 1990).
301. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (requiring connection with interstate or foreign commerce).
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on the interests of another sovereign.3 °2 Given the pervasive

nature of fraud,3 °3 it is probable that many violations falling
under the statute will involve non-U.S. actors engaged in U.S.
conduct.3 0 4
It is unlikely that other countries would object to aggressive attempts by the United States to control fraudulent activity
by non-U.S. actors within U.S. borders.30 5 In past securities
fraud cases, non-U.S. governments have not challenged broad
U.S. jurisdiction.30 6 Because RICO, like the securities regulations, targets activity that is forbidden in most countries,3 °7 liberal jurisdiction in RICO cases will not interfere with international comity.
4. Broad Application Will Not Unduly Burden
'the Federal Judiciary
Granting federal jurisdiction over controversies not previously heard by the federal courts often raises the "floodgates"
argument. 30 8 Those who set forth this argument are concerned that the federal judiciary will become further
overburdened if a new line of cases is introduced into the fed302. Id.
303. See 1984 U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANN. REP. TO THE ATr'Y GEN.

42 (stating

that many RICO suits against legitimate businesses involve allegations of fraud). Statistics place losses due to fraud at more than US$200,000,000,000 annually. Id.
304. FMC Corp. v. Varonos, No. 87-C-9640, 1988 WL 116825 (N.D. I11.Oct. 28,
1988), aft'd, 892 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing strong public policy interest
in granting U.S. jurisdiction over claims involving non-U.S. nationals who furthered
fraudulent schemes by communications to United States).
305. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 416 reporter's note 3 (noting that
securities laws, unlike antitrust regulations, do not prohibit conduct which other nations favor or require). Plaintiffs have also filed a suit in the Netherlands Antilles, but
because that country's securities regulation laws are still in a developmental stage,
plaintiffs' suit is more likely to succeed under U.S. jurisdiction. Petitioner's Brief for
Writ of Certiorari at 10, Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 638 (1991) (No. 91-641); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, pt. IV, § 9A.02(4)(0 (1991).
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 416 cmt. b.
307. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991). A pattern of acts which
may constitute a RICO violation include murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, rob-

bery, bribery, extortion, narcotics dealing, counterfeiting, white slave trafficking and
various forms of fraud. Id.
308. This argument generally discourages extension of the federal courts'
power to hear new types of cases on the theory that any extension may result in a
"flood" of such cases into the federal forum.
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eral court system. 30 9 The "floodgates" argument is often valid
because there are so few federal judges in comparison to the
number of cases they must hear.3 10 For several reasons, however, this concern is not sufficiently grave to justify limiting
federal jurisdiction over these RICO claims.3 1
First, no historical data exists to support the "floodgates"
argument in this area of the law.31 2 Since the issue of extraterritorial application was first presented to the federal judiciary
twenty years ago, the courts have developed increasingly relaxed standards, thereby permitting more cases to be heard. 3 '
Even so, the federal courts have not been overrun by predomi31 4
nantly non-U.S. securities transactions cases.
Second, the federal judiciary itself crafts the standard for
subject matter jurisdiction in extraterritorial securities
cases.3 1 5 Congress does not force the judiciary to adjudicate
these largely non-U.S. RICO controversies.31 6 Rather, the judiciary has freely expanded its jurisdiction from wholly domestic violations to violations that include very limited domestic
elements. 1 7
Third, the structure of the U.S. federal government, par-

ticularly that of the federal judiciary, allows for liberal extension of federal jurisdiction. 1

Congress, in passing RICO and

309. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(arguing that United States has limited interest in adjudicating transnational securities cases involving primarily non-U.S. actors merely on basis of small amount of U.S.
conduct).
310. See Report of the Proceedingsof the Judicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 12,
1990, at 3-7 (reporting that, in the year ending June 30, 1990, 72 three-judge court
of appeals panels heard 787 cases and 575 district court judges heard 319 cases).
311. See supra note 31 (listing extraterritorial RICO cases).
312. See supra note 31 (listing extraterritorial RICO cases).
313. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.) (setting
forth strict standard), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); cf Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638
(1991) (adopting more relaxed standard); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421
(9th Cir. 1983) (same).
314. See supra note 31 (listing extraterritorial RICO cases).
315. See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating
that courts often must interpret Congressional intent).
316. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
317. See generally Alfadda, 935 F.2d 475 (granting jurisdiction over predominantly
non-U.S. transaction).
318. MALCOLM E.JEWELL & SAMUEL S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 476-77 (3d ed. 1977) (explaining that courts may interpret legis-

lation and legislature may correct inaccurate interpretations).
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other securities statutes, made no mention of its intent regarding the extraterritorial application of these regulations. 3 19 As
is usually the case, the courts were left to interpret the statutes
and "fill in the blanks.132 Under the U.S. government's tri-

partite system of checks and balances, Congress may intervene
by amending the statute to clarify the congressional intent if it
believes the courts have wrongly interpreted the statute.3 2

Finally, the appellate system serves as an additional control.3 2 The U.S. Supreme Court is aware of the standards set
by the circuits in this area. 3 Once the lower courts have
clearly framed the legal conflict, the Supreme Court will be
free to choose the standard that best serves the purpose of the
regulations. 4 Once again, if the Supreme Court missteps,
Congress may speak on the issue. 5

C. JudicialActivism and the Need for Legislation
As explained earlier, Congress did not address the issue of
extraterritorial application in the RICO statute.3 2 As a result,
the courts have engaged in judicial activism 3 7 to determine
319. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007 (lacking any mention of extraterritoriality).
320. See James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare
Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345 (1986) (discussing
need for courts to interpret statutes and fill in blanks left by Congress); Mark I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under FederalLaw, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 41
(1979) (explaining that legislation is often ambiguous); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R.
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195, 1231 (1982)
'(same).
321. Rehnquist, supra note 320, at 369-70.
322. Id.
323. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991);
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
492 U.S. 939 (1989); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Churchill Forest Indus. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub. nom. Manley v.
Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
324. Rehnquist, supra note 320, at 369-70.
325. Id.
326. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991) (lacking any mention of
extraterritoriality); see also H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007 (same).
327. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82
Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1121 (1988) (defining judicial activism as use ofjudicial power
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the proper extraterritorial scope of RICO.28 Some courts and
commentators criticize this exercise of independent discretion,
arguing that courts should not exercise that discretion to create new laws. 3 29 These opponents believe that courts should
only interpret existing legislation because courts are illequipped to legislate accurately in these complex international
3 30

areas.

The judiciary, however, has had no choice but to legislate
in these extraterritorial securities cases. 3 3 ' Absent a directive
from Congress, the courts are forced to articulate rules governing transnational RICO litigation.3 3 2 In the interest of uniformity, Congress should set forth a standard for the extraterritorial application of RICO.3 3 3 The legislature is better suited
than the courts to address this issue, especially because extraterritorial application of any statute has an impact on international affairs.3 3 4 International matters require a great deal of
flexibility due to the changing nature of politics and economto override or frustrate decisions of legislative or executive officials); BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 847 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary defines "judicial activism" as
U]udicial philosophy which motivates judges to depart from strict adherence
to judicial precedent in favor of progressive and new social policies which
are not always consistent with the restraint expected of appellate judges. It
is commonly marked by decisions calling for social engineering and occasionally these decisions represent intrusions into legislative and executive
matters.
Id.
328. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 n.21 (3d Cir.) (noting lack of legislative guidance regarding proper transnational scope of U.S. jurisdiction under
§ 10(b)), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1979); see
also Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting
same and consequent need for judicial determination).
329. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32 (arguing that courts should not speculate about
congressional intent regarding scope of U.S. jurisdiction over transnational securities
fraud).
330. Id.
331. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114 n.21; Zoesch, 824 F.2d at 29-30.
332. See lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, .1017-18 ('2d Cir. 1975) (indicating
that courts must devise test for scope of proper extraterritorial application of U.S.
securities laws).
333. Cf: Zoesch, 824 F.2d at 33 (calling for 'congressional action regarding extraterritorial scope of SEA).
334. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that courts are not qualified to evaluate purely
political factors); see also United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1990)
(explaining that political question doctrine is designed to restrain judiciary from
inappropriately interfering with business of other branches).
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ics. ss 5 The debates preceding any legislative decision are necessarily more complete than those debates preceding a judicial
decision. A larger number of parties are involved and their
opinions considered. The result is that legislation is more precisely drafted than judicial opinions and addresses a larger
number of concerns.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. judiciary should be vigilant in applying federal
law to predominantly non-U.S. transactions whenever some
substantial conduct or effect occurs within the United States.
This vigilance will advance predictability in the application of
the statute to non-U.S. actors. It will not have an adverse impact on international comity nor will it result in a greater burden on the federal judiciary. Finally, broad application will
serve to protect the integrity of the United States in international circles. Given the fact that the United States has a significant interest in preventing fraudulent schemes which involve
U.S. conduct or result in a U.S. effect, the courts should be
willing to grant jurisdiction liberally when either of these elements is present. However, Congress should amend the RICO
statute to express more clearly its intent regarding the extraterritorial application of this law.
Tara Ann Carroll*
335. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (explaining that legislature or
executive should address international matters).
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